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JUDGMENTS - DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS - AVAILABILITY TO ALLEGED INFRINGERS IN PATENT CASES - In addition to an injunction and an
accounting, the prayer of the plaintiff requested a declaratory judgment to determine the plaintiff's rights in relation to a patent of the defendant. The petition alleged the plaintiff was importing and offering for sale a chemical called
"Estradoil," and that the defendant had notified the plaintiff's customers that
the chemical infringed the defendant's patent. A year prior to the action, the
defendant had published a notice in a trade journal stating that a certain patent
had been issued to it which covered the chemical known as "Estradoil," and that
any use of the chemical by others constituted infringement. Held, case dismissed
because there was no showing of bad faith to sustain an action for unfair competition, and no "actual controversy" to maintain jurisdiction under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act.1 Treemond Co. v. Schering Corp., (D. C. N. J.
1940) 35 F. Supp. 475.
Most of the federal courts have held that there is an "actual controversy"
to support jurisdiction under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act when the
petitioner is engaged in the manufacture, use, or sale of a product or process,
and a patentee charges the petitioner or his customers with infringement. 2 Thus,
an alleged infringer is now afforded prompt relief, whereas before the Declaratory Judgment Act he was forced to wait until the patentee sued, or until the
charges of infringement warranted the allegation of bad faith necessary £or an

48 Stat. L. 955 (1934), 28 U. S. C. (1934), § 400.
For a list and discussion of pertinent cases up to 1938, see Federico, "Operation
of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in Patent Cases," 19 J. PAT. OFF. Soc.
489 (1937), and Federico, "Recent Declaratory Judgment Patent Cases," 20 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc. 620 (1938). The more recent cases, with the exception of the principal
case, recognize the existence of an actual controversy. E. W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal
Process Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 102 F. (2d) 105; United States Galvanizing &
Plating Equipment Corp. v. Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939)
104 F. (2d) 856; Milwaukee Gas Specialty Co. v. Mercoid Corp., (C. C. A. 7th,
1939) 104 F. (2d) 589; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co.,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1939) 106 F. (2d) 769; Creamery Package Mfg. Co. v. CherryBurrell Corp., (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 980, reversing (D. C. Del. 1940) 33
F. Supp. 625; Lances v. Letz, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 916; Booth Fisheries
Corp. v. General Foods Corp., (D. C. Del. 1939) 27 F. Supp. 268; Ferry-Hallock Co.
1
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injunction.8 There are a few cases, however, with which the principal case must
be classified, adopting a strict construction of the act to withhold a beneficial
remedy.4 The tenor of these cases suggests that the reluctance to apply a more
liberal view is induced by the fear that opening the doors of the courts to alleged
infringers will result in hardship to the patentee. Declaratory judgments probably should be denied, in spite of the existence of an actual controversy, where
such litigation imposes a burden upon defendant greater than the benefit to be
derived by the plaintiff through a declaration of his legal status. A patent is the
grant of an exclusive privilege and should not be turned into a liability by subjecting the owner to numerous lawsuits. But everyone who thinks he may be
infringing cannot compel the patentee to defend a declaratory judgment action;
the patentee has control over the number of suits to which he may be liable,
since he must make charges of infringement to create an actual controversy.
Apparently, a few courts do not accept this answer as adequate, possibly because
such a position may curtail another legal right of the patentee.11 Two of the three
cases denying declaratory judgments, as well as the principal case, contain reiterations of the patentee's privilege to m~ke good-faith charges of infringement.
Upon analysis, the usefulness of the right to allege infringement is not seriously
impaired by the ability of an alleged infringer to obtain a declaratory judgment.
I£ the petitioner is not infringing, or the patent is void, the patentee has no right
to charge the petitioner with infringement. His ability to do so in good faith
without liability, when he does not have the right, is due to the impossibility of
ascertaining the validity or extent of his patent in absence of an adjudication.
v. Frost, (D. C. N. Y. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 27; Man-Sew Pinking Attachment Corp.
v. Chandler Machine Co., (D. C. Mass. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 950; Bakelite Corp. v.
Luibri-Zol Development Corp., (D. C. Del. 1940) 34 F. Supp. 142; Consolidated
Packaging Machinery Corp. v. General Mills, (D. C. Del. 1940) 36 F. Supp. II2,
See 45 YALE L. J. 160 (1935); Rossman, "Declaratory Judgments," 17 J. PAT. OFF,
Soc. 3 (1935). On declaratory judgments in general, see Borchard, "Recent Developments in Declaratory Relief," 10 TEMPLE L. REV. 233 (1936); BoRCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (1934).
8 Even where there is bad faith, an injunction or action for unfair competition is
not as adequate as a declaratory judgment because the validity of the patent or the
petitioner's infringement cannot be determined.
4 New Discoveries v. Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation, (D. C. Wis. 1936)
13 F. Supp. 596; Bettis v. Patterson-Ballagh Corp., (D. C. Cal. 1936) 16 F. Supp.
455; Meinecke v. Eagle Druggists Supply Co., (D. C. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp.
523, in which the defendant in an infringement suit counterclaimed for a declaratory
judgment on two patents not involved in the infringement suit. When the court does
not recognize the existence of an actual controversy where the alleged infringer instigates the suit, the Declaratory Judgment Act still may be of some benefit. If the
patentee brings suit for infringement, the defendant can counterclaim for declaratory
judgment on the patent, and, according to the better considered cases, the patentee will
be unable to dismiss the counterclaim. Leach v. Ross Heater & Mfg. Co., (C. C. A.
2d, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 88, reversing (D. C. N. Y. 1938) 25 Supp. 822. For earlier
cases, see Federico, "Operation of the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in Patent
Cases," 19 J. PAT, OFF. Soc. 489 at 516 (1937).
11 For an expression of :the fear that the Declaratory Judgment Act will be abused
in patent cases, see Stripling and Thomas, "Declaratory Judgments in Patent Cases,"
17 J. PAT. OFF. Soc. 422 (1935).
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If the petitioner is guilty of infringement, he may believe in his claim, or he may
be infringing knowingly. 6 In either event, the patentee probably will find it
necessary to bring suit to halt the petitioner's infringement. Continued charges
of infringement not followed by suit are subject to injunction or an action for
unfair competition.7 An infringer who is sufficiently interested and financially
able to seek a declaratory judgment is unlikely to be deterred by the patentee's
charges of infringement. It is, therefore, improbable that declaratory judgments
will involve the pat~ntee in additional litigation. They merely enable the alleged
infringer to control the instigation of the suit. This disadvantage to the patentee
is outweighed by the possibility that the patentee is abusing the privilege of
charging infringement to strengthen a void or limited patent. In adopting a
strict application of the Declaratory Judgment Act, the principal case reflects
other weaknesses in the previous decisions denying declaratory relief. One ground
stated for the nonsuit is the plaintiff's failure to allege that it is infringing the
defendant's patent.8 Two forms of declaratory relief are open to a petitioner: an
invalidation of the patent, or a proclamation that the petitioner is not infringing.
If a petitioner must allege that he is infringing, the latter adjudication is precluded. Another reason given by the court for rejecting jurisdiction is that the
defendant simply notified the plaintiff's customers that the chemical infringed
defendant's patent, without giving notice of infringement to the plaintiff himself.9 The real damage to the plaintiff arises from the threatening of its cus6 The cases reaching decisions on the merits have declared the patents of the
defendant either void, or not infringed by the plaintiff. Ferry-Hallock Co. v. Frost,
(D. C. N. Y. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 27; Hanson-Van Winkle-Munning Co. v. United
States Galvanizing & Plating Equipment Corp., (D. C. W. Va. 1938) 24 F. Supp.
249, affirmed in United States Galvanizing & Plating Equipment Corp. v. HansonVan Winkle-Munning Co., (C. C. A. 4th, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 856; Man-Sew Pinking
Attachment Corp. v. Chandler Machine Co., (D. C. Mass. 1940) 33 F. Supp. 950;
E. Edelmann & Co. v. Triple-A Specialty Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 88 F. (2d)
852; Ladenson v. Overspred Stoker Co., (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) 89 F. (2d) 242. This
seems to indicate that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is not being abused in
patent cases.
1 A recent case granting a petitioner an injunction against the patentee's charges
of infringement states that it is the patentee's duty to have his patent adjudicated by
an infringement suit instead of seeking relief by repeated threats. Betmar Hats v.
Young America Hats, (C. C. A. 2d, 1941) II6 F. (2d) 956.
8 The principal case cites New Discoveries v. Wisconsin Alumni Foundation,
(D. C. Wis. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 596, which in turn cites no authority for the requirement. In E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1939) 102 F. (2d)
105, the plaintiff definitely alleged, as did the plaintiff in the principal case, that it
was not infringing the defendant's patent, and in most of the other cases granting
declaratory judgments the plaintiffs at least did not allege that they were infringing
defendant's patents.
9
In support of this position the principal case cites Bettis v. Patterson-Ballagh
Corp., (D. C. Cal. 1936) 16 F. Supp. 455, in which the plaintiff is a mere licensor,
with others doing the actual manufacturing and selling. The basis for refusing jurisdiction seems to be that a definite relationship is lacking between the licensor and those
carrying on the manufacturing, since the court states that there will be an actual controversy if the plaintiff alleges that he may be liable for contributory infringement. A
licensor probably should be deemed to have a sufficient interest to maintain a declaratory
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tomers. Such a holding permits a patentee with a defective patent to avoid a
declaratory judgment although he may be ruining a competitor's business. If the
allegation of the plaintiff's petition is interpreted to mean that the advertisement is the only charge of infringement communicated to either the plaintiff or
or its customers, the decision is more tenable since the advertisement does not
name the plaintiff. For the protection of the patentee, and to create an actual
controversy, a petitioner should show that he in particular is charged with
infringement, not merely that the patentee might be referring to him. But if
the plaintiff's chemical is the only product sold under the name of "Estradoil,"
it is a rather unrealistic distinction to hold that the plaintiff is not charged
with infringement.10 With the exception of a few cases, the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act has been so interpreted as to present alleged infringers with a
very useful remedy.

judgment, but even if he does not, there is no such difficulty in the principal case
because the plaintiff is engaged in selling the product.
10 The principal case also mentions the delay in bringing suit as another reason for
there not being an actual controversy. The court seems to hold that there can be no
actual controversy unless the patentee is charging infringement at the time suit is
brought. The decision can be justified if based entirely on the ground that there was
an actual controversy at the time the charge of infringement was made, and that there
continued to be a controversy for a period thereafter, but that the passing of a year
rendered the controversy stale or dead. A controversy survived three months after the
last charge of infringement in Lances v. Letz, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) 115 F. (2d) 916.

